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Europe Has Plans. Implementation Is Lagging

Europe’s first cycle of formal public-health emergency preparedness assessments has found strong laboratory, surveillance and emergency-management capacity across the EU/EEA. It has also exposed recurring weaknesses: preparedness plans that are not consistently implemented, staffing shortages, fragmented data systems and difficulties translating intelligence into decisions.

November 11, 2026
Editorial
European public-health preparedness increasingly depends on testing whether laboratory networks, surveillance systems, emergency plans and decision-making structures can operate together during a real crisis.Andrii Yalanskyi/ Shutterstock.com

IPM Take

Europe’s pandemic preparedness problem is no longer simply the absence of plans. It is the distance between having them and demonstrating that they work.

The first ECDC assessment cycle is a valuable exercise in institutional accountability. Countries have strengthened important capabilities since COVID-19, but preparedness is not demonstrated by the quality of documents, governance committees or laboratory equipment alone. It is demonstrated when those capabilities operate together under pressure.

Executive Summary

ECDC announced completion of the first cycle of Public Health Emergency Preparedness Assessments (PHEPAs)on 29 October.

The assessments began in 2024 and examined preparedness across EU/EEA countries, including surveillance, laboratory capacity, emergency management, risk communication and institutional coordination.

ECDC reported strong core capabilities and significant commitment to emergency preparedness. However, recurring weaknesses included preparedness plans not consistently implemented, insufficient staffing, limitations in interoperable data systems and difficulty translating surveillance information into policy decisions.

The next assessment cycle, planned for 2027–2029, will place greater emphasis on implementation progress and national action plans.

Why it matters

  • Policymakers: Preparedness spending must be linked to measurable operational performance rather than the existence of plans and governance structures.
  • Public-health authorities: Surveillance data, laboratory findings and emergency decisions need reliable coordination across institutions and sectors.
  • Health systems and laboratories: Workforce capacity, routine exercises and information-sharing arrangements are essential for converting technical capabilities into effective response.

Europe has spent the years since COVID-19 rebuilding the political and institutional architecture of health security. Surveillance systems have been strengthened, laboratory networks expanded and new responsibilities assigned to European and national bodies. The public expectation is that the next major infectious-disease emergency will find the continent better prepared.

ECDC’s first complete cycle of public-health emergency preparedness assessments suggests that important progress has been made. It also identifies a familiar weakness: countries can possess strong capabilities without consistently connecting them into an operational system.

The assessments examined surveillance, laboratories, emergency management, communication and coordination across EU/EEA countries. ECDC found substantial commitment to preparedness and acknowledged improvements made after the pandemic. Yet plans are not always fully implemented, staff capacity remains constrained and information systems do not consistently exchange data or support timely decisions.

Those gaps are not minor technical imperfections.

A laboratory may identify an unusual pathogen promptly, but its public-health value depends on whether the result reaches decision-makers. A national plan may clearly assign responsibilities, but the response will struggle if those responsibilities have never been tested through exercises. A surveillance platform may generate detailed intelligence, yet fail operationally if institutions cannot translate that information into action.

Preparedness therefore requires integration as well as investment.

That creates an uncomfortable accountability question for governments. Since COVID-19, political leaders have repeatedly described health security as a strategic priority. Considerable institutional effort has followed. But public-health preparedness cannot be judged solely through announcements, funding allocations or the creation of new structures.

The more meaningful indicators concern performance: whether alerts are investigated quickly, whether laboratories can share information, whether emergency teams have sufficient staff and whether decision-makers understand who is responsible when several institutions must act simultaneously.

ECDC is now moving towards a second assessment cycle covering 2027–2029, with greater attention to national action plans and the implementation of recommendations from the first round. That progression is important because an assessment system without follow-up risks becoming another reporting obligation rather than an instrument for change.

There is also a political incentive problem. Preparedness performs best when nothing dramatic happens, making successful investment difficult to demonstrate to voters. Conversely, institutions can receive considerable attention for responding visibly after an emergency begins. Governments therefore need accountability arrangements that reward the maintenance and testing of capability between crises.

The assessments should not be interpreted as evidence that European preparedness has failed wholesale. ECDC explicitly recognises strong foundational systems and considerable progress.

The sharper conclusion is that the next stage of preparedness is less about proving that capacity exists and more about proving that it can be mobilised reliably.

Europe has learned how to describe readiness. It now needs to demonstrate it under realistic conditions.

Source & Evidence